

**A NEW  
DICTIONARY  
OF THE  
SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**Edited by  
G. Duncan Mitchell**

**Second Edition**

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G. Duncan Mitchell**

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# Preface

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*A New Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, with many entries revised and new ones added, follows the successful career of its predecessor *A Dictionary of Sociology* first published in 1968. That book proved to be a valuable part of the student's equipment; it is confidently hoped that its successor will likewise be as useful.

Some terms are explained quite briefly, others at some length. In sociology it is not possible to be very helpful without discussing various usages *and* the theoretical and other interests which underlie such variations. Thus fairly long entries are given on words such as *authority*, *consensus*, *function*, *role*, *social stratification* and the like, whereas quite short entries suffice for others like *agnate*, *eidos* or *mores*. In the choice of words a generous definition of sociology has been employed and some words used by students of cultural and social anthropology, social psychology and political science as well as by sociologists are included.

It remains for me to express my thanks to contributors and to my colleagues in the Department of Sociology in the University of Exeter who have been of assistance, in particular Professor R. A. B. Leaper, Dr J. A. Vincent and Mr Stephen Mennell, and especially my secretary, Miss Rosalind Webber, whose assistance went far beyond typing the manuscript and who helped to reduce the number of errors.

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# A

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**abstraction.** It is difficult to give a satisfactory definition of *abstraction* since its use often presupposes an oversimple conception of how both thinking and theory construction proceed. Abstraction can be said to take place when we select from the phenomena we study, and whose character we wish to describe, such traits as would form a basis for their classification. The term *abstraction* has two main meanings.

1. It refers to the fact that to describe or explain anything selection is necessary. Every theory, whether in the social or the natural sciences, omits some variables because they are less relevant, or apparently so, to the phenomena to be explained or predicted by the theory. To the extent that knowledge is possessed of the conditions under which the neglected variables are or are not significant, the more powerful is the theory.

2. In the natural sciences abstraction refers to concepts such as a perfect gas or an instantaneous velocity, and in the social sciences to such concepts as a perfectly rational act or a perfectly integrated group. These serve as logical devices or constructs for the analysis and clarification of complex occurrences, and the making of predictions.

Useful discussions of both these aspects can be found in E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, 1961, and in L. Gross, *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, 1959.

A.H.

**accommodation.** The state or process of adjustment to a conflict situation in which overt expressions of hostility are avoided and certain compensatory advantages, economic, social or psychological, are gained by both sides, while leaving the source of conflict unresolved and allowing the structural inequalities giving rise to minority subordination to persist. For example, see Sheila Patterson, *Dark Strangers: A Study of the Absorption of a Recent West Indian Migrant Group in Brixton*, 1964. See ACCULTURATION, ASSIMILATION, CONFLICT.

A.H.R.

**acculturation.** The process whereby an individual or a group acquires the cultural characteristics of another through direct contact and interaction. From an individual point of view this is a process of social learning similar to that of adult socialization in which linguistic communication plays an essential role. From a social point of view *acculturation* implies the diffusion of particular values, techniques and institutions and their modification under different conditions. It may give rise to *culture conflict* and to adaptation leading to a modification of group identity. G. A. DeVos (ed.), *Response to Change: Society, Culture and Personality*, 1976. See ASSIMILATION, CONFLICT, SOCIALIZATION.

A.H.R.

**acephalous.** Used in relation to societies to describe those that are 'stateless'. In such societies positions of authority within kinship or domestic group provide a means of control together with institutionalized behaviour relating to lineages, tribes and tribal segments. See J. Middleton and D. Tait (eds), *Tribes Without Rulers*, 1958.

**achievement role.** See **ROLE**.

**action; social action.** Action, or behaviour, is a psychological category and has been regarded as the basic unit by many psychologists. In this connection it is usual to speak of the Behaviourists, i.e. those who subscribe to the fundamental propositions of J. B. Watson. Yet a more useful term is that of *social action*, which is used both by social psychologists and sociologists. This is regarded by many as the proper unit of observation in the social sciences. Action is social when the actor behaves in such a manner that his action is intended to influence the actions of one or more other persons. Thus interaction is the context in which the personality develops. (See G. H. Mead, *The Mind, Self and Society*, 1934.) In sociology it was Max Weber who first explicitly used and emphasized social action as the basis for theory. His typology of social action: *Wertrationalität*, *Zweckrationalität*, *Traditional* and *Affektuell* was, he held, fundamental for his work, but it was the second category of action, i.e. purposively rational action, that he was mainly concerned with in his analysis of socio-economic systems, for this kind of action, he said, is oriented to a system of discrete individual ends, such that the end, the means and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed; this was the type of social action associated with Capitalism.

D. Martindale in *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory*, 1961, considers a number of sociological writers, beginning with Weber, to constitute a school of Social Behaviourists. According to his account they are an impressive collection of people including Thorstein Veblen, Robert MacIver, Karl Mannheim, Florian Znaniecki, Talcott Parsons and R. K. Merton; he associates himself with this school. It is a moot point how far these writers can be usefully so classified, particularly as one important problem, on which there is some disagreement, is how far reliance can be placed on mere observation of external behaviour, without reference to the meaning that action has for the actors in a situation. G.D.M.

**action research.** Much social science springs from the desire to alter and improve a social situation, or to help people in need. *Action research* is investigation of a kind oriented to these ends, where the aim is not only to collect information and arrive at a better understanding, but to do something practical as well. Sometimes, the exponents of action research are dubious about the possibility of making detached and scientific studies of human affairs. They may argue, for example, that an investigator cannot but influence the behaviour of the people he is studying, that experimentation is extremely difficult, if not impossible, in the social sciences, that there is the intermediary of the human instrument in measurement, and that all these vitiate the scientific status of social research.

Usually, action research is concerned with social change, with therapy to individuals or a small social group, or has as its object to improve the efficiency of an organization. The theoretical basis of this practice has been set out by Adam Curle in an article in *Human Relations*, vol. II, No. 3, 1949. Action research has been trenchantly criticized by Michael Argyle in *The Scientific Study of Social Behaviour*, 1957, where he argues that the discovery of scientific results is always secondary in action research. He further argues that action research should seek to obtain objective results of two kinds: (1) it should prove that the activity is genuinely effective in increasing output, or in reducing hostility in a group, or in achieving therapy, and (2) it should show the precise conditions under which successful results can be obtained, so that others can do the same.

G.D.M.

**adapt; adaptation.** Originally, the term is biological in nature and refers to the processes whereby an organism accommodates to its environment. In sociology *adaptation* is used loosely to refer to the manner in which a social system, be it a small group such as the family, or a larger collectivity such as an organization or even a total society, like a tribal society, fits into the physical or social environment. In structural-functionalist theory it has been held that the adaptive system is one of the structural pre-requisites designed to meet a functional problem posed by survival. In any total social system the problem is met by the economic and technological arrangements. See H. Johnson, *Sociology: A Systematic Interpretation*, 1961.

G.D.M.

**adelphic polyandry.** See POLYANDRY.

**adjust; adjustment.** A term that is psychological rather than sociological, used by some social psychologists to refer to the process whereby an individual enters into a harmonious or healthy relationship with his environment, physical or social, but occasionally used by some sociologists to refer to a social unit, like a group or organization, accomplishing the same end. The difficulty posed by most discussions, where the term is used, is in coping with the value implications of what is harmonious or healthy, but sometimes in the literature this problem is blandly ignored.

**affine; affinity.** See KINSHIP.

**age-grades; age-sets.** The expression 'age-society' in the sense of *age-grade* was used by Heinrich Schurtz in *Alterklassen und Mannerbunde*, 1902, when he suggested that there was a tripartite division in society which reflected the conflict of proximate age groups or generations. He considered the grades of 'the uninitiated', 'the initiated single men' and 'the elders' as potentially universal in human society.

In general, *age-grade* is used to refer to the division of society into a number of sections based upon 'sociological' age. Age-grades form the structural framework through which specific age-sets pass. Different clusters of rights, duties, obligations and privileges are associated with the different statuses in the age-grade divisions of society. Often particular ceremonial or military functions are performed by sets in different grades.

The *age-grade system* is a type of stratification which cuts across the division of societies into tribes, clans and lineages and permits of a high degree of central control within the society.

An *age-set* is a formally organized group of men or women recruited on the basis of 'sociological' age. There are usually public ceremonies when the sets are formed and when the different sets advance through the age-grade structure. Probably the most important of these stages is the initiation ceremony when youths and maidens acquire mature status. In several societies circumcision and clitoridectomy are associated with this *rite de passage*. J. G. Peristiany discusses this in some detail in his book *The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis*, 1939. An interesting variant of the age-set division of society is the form it takes among the Nyakusa of Tanzania where parents and initiated sons live in separate age-villages. This is the subject of a study by M. Wilson in *Good Company: A study of Nyakyusa Age-Villages*, 1951. See INITIATION.

B.H.A.R.

**agelecism.** A term coined by E. Benoit-Smullyan from the Greek word for group in order to characterize the 'synthesis of a positivistic methodology with a particular set of substantive theories'. Chief of these are the sociologic theories of Émile Durkheim. The origins of agelecism are to be found in the writings of Louis de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre who advanced the notion that the social group precedes the individual and indeed constitutes him, that the group is the source of values and culture, and that social events and changes are not, and cannot be, the effects of purely individual volitions and desires. The term is used in a chapter by E. Benoit-Smullyan entitled 'The Sociologism of Émile Durkheim and his School' in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology*, 1948, edited by H. E. Barnes.

G.D.M.

**agnate; agnation.** In Roman law *agnati* were kinsfolk, men and women, related to each other by descent from a common male ancestor and who were under a single authority in the family. In modern usage the term is restricted to men only without reference to a common familial authority, so that an agnate is one related by descent through males only. Commonly, the preferred term is *patrilineal*. See KINSHIP, PATRILINEAL.

**alienation.** Broadly speaking, alienation denotes the estrangement of the individual from key aspects of his or her social existence, and in the 1950s and early 1960s, it dominated contemporary literature and sociological thought. (M. Seeman, 'On the Meaning of Alienation', *American Sociological Review*, XXIV, 6, 1959. See also R. Nisbet, *The Quest for Community*, 1953, for an overview of the historical background to the notion of *alienation*.)

Part of the difficulty of providing an adequate analysis of this concept is that the term occurs in such a wide variety of disciplines, including sociology, social and political philosophy, psychoanalysis, existentialist philosophy, and so on. Furthermore, there is the added difficulty that alienation is one of those concepts, which have tended to abound in sociology, used to describe and explain almost any kind of social behaviour and usually succeeding in describing and explaining nothing. Among other things it has been used to

explain ethnic prejudice, mental illness, class consciousness, industrial conflict, political apathy and extremism.

It was Marx, following and amending the idealist conception of alienation used by Hegel, who first introduced the concept into sociological theory. For Marx, it is Man's nature to be his own creator by transforming the world outside him in co-operation with others. However, this nature has become alien to man; it is no longer his but belongs to another person or thing. In religion, for example, it is God who is the subject of the historical process holding the initiative and Man in a state of dependence. In economics it is the money that controls men as though they were objects. In short, man has lost control over his own destiny and sees this control vested in other entities. What is proper to man has become alien, an attribute of something else. In capitalism, the social arrangements which formed the context of work alienated the worker in that they failed to provide him with the opportunities for a meaningful and creative existence. The worker is alienated in that he neither receives satisfaction from his work nor receives the full product of his labour. The idea here seems to be that the role-specialization and unequal distribution of authority and rewards, characteristic of industrial production, prevents the worker from exercising his full creative powers endowed by nature. (See K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, 1844, 1959, and D. McLellan, *Karl Marx: His Life and Thought*, 1973.) E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, 1956, suggests a characterization of *alienation* which is, in a number of respects, close to that of Marx. For Fromm, *alienation* is that condition when man 'does not experience himself as the action bearer of his own powers and richness, but as an impoverished "thing" dependent on powers outside of himself'.

For Marx alienation was as much a structural feature as psychological. However, in the 1950s it began more and more to be regarded as a socio-psychological condition of the individual. This began with Seeman's germinal work noted above. Faced with what he regarded as the vagueness and unclarity of the literature, Seeman isolated the various uses of the term and recast them in a way which would allow them to be operationalized and measured. The first meaning so isolated, 'powerlessness', was that of alienation as a feeling on the part of the individual that he cannot influence the social situations in which he interacts. The second variant, 'meaninglessness', is a feeling that he has no guides for conduct or belief. 'Normlessness' is the individual's feeling that illegitimate means are required to achieve valued goals. 'Isolation' is a feeling of estrangement from the cultural goals of society, and the final variant, 'self-estrangement', an inability to find any self-rewarding activities in life. Each of these Seeman postulates as independent from each other. Each has been measured by means of various attitude scales and allowed the further exploration of the social contexts which can produce alienation. (See, for example, A. G. Neal and M. Seeman, 'Organisations and Powerlessness: A Test of the Mediation Hypothesis', *American Sociological Review*, XXIX, 2, 1962; R. Blauner, *Alienation and Freedom*, 1964, is an analysis of the alienative consequence of different types of work situation. But see also in the more classically Marxian tradition, H. Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*, 1974.)

These formulations make the term specific to the attitudinal level of social behaviour which, in its turn, is assumed to be associated with certain social structural characteristics. The social conditions held to be productive of feelings of alienation have been seen as, for example, and following the original Marxian idea, the pattern of industrial production. W. Kornhauser sees the decline of semi-autonomous groups within a society, groups such as voluntary associations, local communities, and neighbourhoods, as producing feelings of alienation and, furthermore, making such people more available for the appeals of extremist groups (W. Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, 1956). For others the sheer growth in societal scale and the consequent 'depersonalization' of social relations is the main factor producing alienation. Others link the concept with the notion of mass society. (See P. Olsen, *America as a Mass Society*, 1963; S. Giner, *Mass Society*, 1976.)

A number of investigators have concentrated on alienation as it is manifested in limited and specific organizational contexts, arguing that outside such contexts it is rarely clear what the individual is alienated from. This stemmed from a dissatisfaction with uses of the term, noted earlier, which view alienation as a generalized condition affecting the whole of an individual's social perception. Likewise, Dean suggests that alienation is a 'situation-relevant' variable such that the individual can experience different degrees of alienation in different social contexts. (D. Dean, 'Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement', *American Sociological Review*, XXVI, 5, 1961.)

This attempt to make alienation a more objective, empirically researchable concept free from certain implicit value assumptions, has come under attack, especially from a number of sociologists who consider that sociology can and ought to make value-judgments about the quality of life. (See J. Horton, 'The Dehumanisation of Anomie and Alienation', *British Journal of Sociology*, XV, 4, 1964; L. Feuer, 'What is Alienation? The Career of a Concept', in M. Stein and A. Vidich, *Sociology on Trial*, 1963.) There is no doubt that the attempts, discussed above, to operationalize the concept, have taken it a long way from its original use in Marx, where it is closely tied to a moral and philosophical conception of human nature and, consequently, a category for moral criticism. It was not to be equated simply with attitudes of dissatisfaction with one's life. On the contrary, a person could be satisfied and content, yet to the extent that one was part of a system in which one was treated as an object, a 'thing', having little or no control over one's life and creative powers, then, in Marx's sense of the term, one was still alienated. (See B. Ollman, *Alienation: Marx's Critique of Man in Capitalist Society*, 1971.) See ANOMIE, MASS SOCIETY.

J.A.H.

**ambilateral.** A term used in respect of those kinship systems where a person is able to choose to which parental kin group he or she will become attached.

**anascopic.** Adjective used to identify the kind of social theory (e.g., that of George C. Homans) which starts from the individual and looks upward to construct a conception of society. See T. Geiger, ed. P. Trappe, *Arbeiten zur Soziologie: Sociologische Texte*, vol. 7, Neuwied, Berlin, p. 147f. See KATASCOPIC.

**animism; animatism.** The formulation of the theory of *animism* is the work of Sir E. B. Tylor and may be found in his *Primitive Culture*, 1871. The notion was part of a theory of primitive religion which endeavoured to account for the attribution by some peoples of a spiritual existence to animals, plants, and even on occasion to inanimate objects. Tylor argued that early man had a need to explain dreams, hallucinations, sleep and death, and that the need to understand such phenomena led to the belief in the existence of the soul or an indwelling personality. When a man dreamed and saw in his dream a person who was dead, then this was the man's spirit or soul visiting him. Similarly, to dream of oneself in another place was one's own soul parted from the body in sleep.

This idea was modified by some anthropologists, notably R. R. Marett, who in his book *The Threshold of Religion*, 1914, elaborated an idea he had put forward in 1899. This was a theory of *animatism*, a pre-animistic stage in religious development. Marett pointed to the sense of wonder which primitive man was supposed to have, and most especially in regard to unusual natural objects or the unusual behaviour of natural objects like volcanoes, rivers and so forth. To these, he argued, primitive man attributed an 'impersonal power' or 'spiritual force' comparable to the *mana* of the Oceanic peoples, described by Bishop Codrington. Mana is 'a force, altogether distinct from physical power, which acts in all kinds of ways for good or evil, and which is of greatest advantage to possess and control'. Mana enhances the qualities of a thing or a process – crops, children or their growth.

The notion of animism was strongly supported by Herbert Spencer, who held it to be a general phenomenon. Both *animism* and *animatism* have been criticized for being theories that are over-intellectual, the chief critics being Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, both of whom advanced different theories of primitive religion.

G.D.M.

**anomie; anomy.** The term *anomie* was first used by the French sociologist, Émile Durkheim, to refer to several aspects of social participation where the conditions necessary for man to fulfil himself and to attain happiness were not present. These conditions were that conduct should be governed by norms, that these norms should form an integrated and non-conflicting system, that the individual should be morally involved with other people so that 'the image of the one who completes me becomes inseparable from mine' and so that clear limits were set to the pleasures attainable in life. Any state where there are unclear, conflicting or unintegrated norms, in which the individual had no morally significant relations with others or in which there were no limits set to the attainment of pleasure, was a state of *anomie*.

R. K. Merton uses the term to refer to a state in which socially prescribed goals and the norms governing their attainment are incompatible. Leo Srole has attempted to construct an index of *anomie*. In most attempts to make *anomie* measurable, emphasis is placed on lack of clarity in goals and norms or upon the absence of social ties. All such attempts involve a more restricted use of the concept than Durkheim's which was related to a philosophical conception of human nature. See É. Durkheim, *Division of Labour*, translated 1947; *Suicide*, translated 1951; R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 1949, ch. IV.

J.A.R.



**anthropology.** This is the name given to a cluster of studies of startling diversity imbued with the faith that an integrated science of man in his biological, cultural and social aspects is possible. Taken as a whole, the anthropological range is immense: in time from the first appearances of humans on this planet and, contemporaneously, aspects of *all* societies but more particularly those conventionally classified as tribal and peasant. Anthropology has inherited and maintains European man's post-Renaissance awareness and burgeoning inquiry into the origins and meanings of the variety of peoples, cultures and societies so recently encountered.

The main sectors in terms of which anthropology is presently organized are:

*Biological anthropology*, which begins with the zoological view of man's status; attempts to trace his origin and development through comparative studies of fossil, recent and living primates; engages in an examination of the nature of racial diversity; examines the effects of various ecological factors on human adaptability and variability, on the growth and decline of populations, etc. The biological anthropologist, although using techniques of his own, is reliant on other disciplines, notably anatomy, archaeology, biochemistry, botany, genetics, geology and palaeontology.

*Archaeology*, which is the classification of the material remains of human societies on the bases of function, chronology and cultural context as a preliminary to the formulation of explanatory generalizations regarding transformations of societies.

*Social anthropology* is currently characterized by approaches which, broadly, are associational, semantic and transformational in their emphases.

The associational emphasis abstracts from human activity forms or structures which provide the terms on which people may relate to one another. The principal forms are networks, e.g., of friends (Boissevain); and corporations, e.g., lineages, universities (Smith). A society's associational structures provide the contexts for all kinds of activities (domestic, economic, political, religious, recreational, legal, medical etc.) and are seen as functionally interrelated. Societies may be distinguished by the kinds of corporations and networks they comprise and their modes of interrelationship.

The semantic emphasis seeks to discern the structure of meaning, the inner logic constituting the sense-making core of all those realities which humans create: social situations, myths, novels, theatrical performances, films, rituals and, at a more abstract level of organization, cultures. The view here is that the 'social fact' is a *relation* internal to a system of relations. 'Meaning is found in the system of relations when taken as a whole, rather than in the limited semantic content of single elements considered in isolation' (Arcand). It is not only that this approach allows us to understand the significance of conventional acts, but also the meaning which people attach to innovative technology such as tractors or intra-uterine devices. (See the entry on *Structuralism*.)

The transformational emphasis is essentially historical. The aim is to comprehend the modes whereby societies or, for example, classes are socially reproduced or otherwise transformed over long periods of time. A recent study of this kind challenges a widely held view propounded by Marx, Weber

etc. that English society experienced these transitional phases from the eleventh century: feudal/peasant, capitalist/peasant, capitalist/modern (Macfarlane).

These broad channels of anthropological inquiry are supported by a number of contributing disciplines, e.g., demography, linguistics, psychology, etc. See L. Mair, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, 2nd edition, 1972; J. Boissevain, *Friends of Friends*, 1974; M. G. Smith, *Corporations and Society*, 1974; B. Arcand, 'Making love is like eating honey or sweet fruit, it causes cavities: an essay on Cuiva symbolism', in E. Schwimmer, ed., *The Yearbook of Symbolic Anthropology I*, 1978; A. Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism*, 1978; J. Honigmann, *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, 1973; B. J. Siegel, ed., *Annual Review of Anthropology*; R. Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology*, 1976. See SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY, STRUCTURALISM.

H.D.M.

**ascribed role.** See ROLE.

**assimilation.** A process of becoming similar or the end state of such a process.

In the United States after World War I there was anxiety about the Americanization of immigrants who seemed attached to the cultures of their homelands, so that for American sociologists assimilation came to mean a one-way process whereby American society was to absorb the newcomers without itself undergoing change. This redefinition of the word reflected American concerns and the popularity of organic analogies. Modern writers insist that assimilation is a two-way process, in which both populations undergo change; in many cases it is also a multi-stage process in which clusters of immigrant groups come to resemble one another and later become less distinctive. To analyse assimilation it is necessary to specify the populations that are compared; the elements of their culture or society that are subject to change; and the direction and speed of change on the part of both populations. See ACCOMMODATION, ACCULTURATION, CONFLICT.

M.P.B.

**association.** The term describes either a process or an entity. The process is of a number of individuals interacting for a specific end or set of purposes. The entity is an organization of individuals who are held together by a recognized set of rules governing their behaviour to one another for a specific end or set of purposes.

Although some associations are large and comprehensive they cannot express the totality of relations which constitute the total life of a community, and thus *association* may be distinguished from *community*. The specificity of aim of an association is seen in F. Tönnies's use of the term *Gesellschaft*, which he contrasts with *Gemeinschaft*. Usually associations are classified according to function, e.g. occupational, religious, recreational, cultural, etc. See COMMUNITY, GEMEINSCHAFT, INSTITUTION.

G.D.M.

**attitude.** The term is normally used to refer to a learned predisposition evidenced by the behaviour of an individual or group of individuals, to evaluate an object or class of objects in a consistent or characteristic way.

Historically the origin of the term can be traced to two separate sources.

The first is its derivation from the Latin *aptus* from which it derived its connotation of 'fitness' or 'suitability'. For example the term was used in this sense by Herbert Spencer when he spoke of the attitude of mind necessary to arrive at correct judgments on disputed issues. This connotation still survives in non-technical usage in such expressions as 'the scientific attitude' or 'an insufficiently critical attitude'. The second source may be traced to the use of the term to describe a posture of the body in painting or sculpture. From this the term became adapted to refer to postures of the body suitable for certain actions and was thus taken up by early experimental psychologists to refer to various forms of muscular and later mental preparedness or set.

While the connotation of fitness or suitability is no longer represented in modern technical usage, the experimental psychological tradition has been developed by behavioural writers who see attitudes primarily in terms of consistency in behaviour. The original behaviourist insistence on the observation of single acts as they were related to single stimuli left little scope to explain the complexities of social behaviour, and attitude thus became used by behavioural theorists as an intervening variable mediating between stimulus and response in order to cope with the extreme complexity of social behaviour. While this behavioural use of the term was similar to that of the earlier experimental psychologists, its use was broadened to allow reference to 'verbal sets to respond' and the term has gradually come to be defined in more subjective terms moving from more restricted usage such as 'attitudes to respond to social stimulation' to speaking of 'radical-conservative attitudes'.

While some writers still remain opposed to a conception of attitudes in any other than strictly behavioural terms, others have been willing to posit intervening variables to mediate observed consistency in behaviour. These variables have conventionally included cognitive components referring to individuals' beliefs about the object or issue in question, affective components referring to his evaluations of the attitude object, and conative components referring to his behavioural intentions with regard to it. These components may be organized in various ways and to varying degrees and are sometimes conceived as constituting subjective representations of values and ideologies.

See ATTITUDE RESEARCH, VALUE, IDEOLOGY.

N.F.L.

**attitude research.** The earliest concern of workers in this field was with measurement; and in particular with the application of mathematical scaling models to behaviour, usually in the form of answers to questionnaire items. The earliest methods were those first developed by Thurstone and his collaborators in the 1920s. These used a group of selected judges who made judgments of a large number of potential attitude items, and these judgments were then used to define the scale values of a more limited set of items which were finally selected for incorporation into the questionnaire. Other methods based upon answers of respondents rather than of judges were the methods of *summative scaling* developed by Likert in the 1930s, and the later method of *cumulative scaling* developed by Guttman during the Second World War, based upon the technique of *scalogram analysis*. More recent research in attitude measurements has concentrated upon the development of alternative methods of data collection many of them based upon unobtrusive

observations of everyday behaviour, and on alternative methods of scaling often employing non-metric procedures. For a recent review of research in this area see N. Lemon, *Attitudes and their Measurement*, 1973.

Having established methods for the measurement of attitudes, research then moved on to a concern with attitude change and the more general issue of social influence. Early work was predominantly problem centred and was prompted by interest in the processes of mass communication, perhaps best described in terms of the well-known theme question 'Who says what, to whom, with what effect?' This question formed the basis of the first monograph in the influential Yale Communication and Attitude Change Program. See C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis and H. H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion*, 1953. This programme accumulated a substantial amount of empirical material on such topics as communicator credibility, effect of fear arousing appeals, organization of persuasive arguments, group influences on attitude change, personality and persuasibility, and the effects of active participation in an issue on attitude change. While this programme touched upon nearly all the subsequently central problems of attitude change, its lack of central theoretical focus directed the attention of social psychologists towards the development of theoretical models of attitude change. One of the most influential works in this area was L. Festinger's *A theory of cognitive dissonance*, 1957, which proposed that the fundamental process underlying attitude change was the necessity to preserve consistency between different parts of an individual's belief system. This model, and others of a similar kind, were responsible for a plethora of laboratory and field investigations in the early and mid-1960s which did much to adjudicate between rival formulations and to establish the limits of the underlying principle. Parallel to these activities were others dating back to the end of the war which sought to establish relationships between attitudes and broader personality characteristics. The best-known work in this area is probably that of T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, 1950, which established a relationship between ethnocentric attitudes and deeper personality factors. Research in the attitude change area has been undertaken in a variety of applied settings most typically in areas such as the study of voting behaviour, racial prejudice and discrimination, consumer behaviour and market research, and in studies of the diffusion of innovations. Moreover an attempt to link the more laboratory-based tradition in the study of attitude change to an analysis of the more sociological conception of *représentation sociale* derived from the work of Durkheim is developing on the continent following the work of S. Moscovici in *La psychanalyse, son image et son public*, 1961.

The relationship between verbally expressed attitude and behaviour is however still problematic, and remains of great significance both for measurement and for study of the processes of attitude formation and change. While research has demonstrated a somewhat equivocal relationship between attitude and behaviour it has also shown the importance of considering attitudes to the situation in which behaviour takes place, as well as to the attitude issue, in the prediction of conduct. See ATTITUDE, AUTHORITARIANISM, PREJUDICE, SCALES, SCALOGRAM ANALYSIS.

N.F.L.

**authoritarian; authoritarianism.** Words in common use, they were brought

into the limelight with the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), where the concept was decomposed into nine overlapping and loosely related variables: *conventionalism* (rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values); *authoritarian submission* (submissive, uncritical attitude towards idealized moral authority of the ingroup); *authoritarian aggression* (tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values); *anti-intraception* (opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded); *superstition and stereotypy* (the belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories); *power and 'toughness'* (preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalized attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness); *destructiveness and cynicism* (generalized hostility, vilification of the human); *projectivity* (the disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses); *sex* (exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings-on').

It must not be assumed that the concept has the same meaning for different writers, and the merit of each test of *authoritarianism* has to be carefully assessed. See T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, 1950; R. Christie and M. Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of 'The Authoritarian Personality'*, 1954. See ATTITUDE RESEARCH. J.K.

**authority; legitimation of authority.** The performance of authoritative actions, i.e. the exercise of authority, is one of the major forms of power through which the actions of a plurality of individual human actors are placed or maintained in a condition of order or are concerted for the collaborative attainment of a particular goal or general goals.

The major mechanisms of the ordering or concerting of actions are:

- (1) *Exchange*;
- (2) *Common interests*;
- (3) *Solidarity* or *consensus* arising from (a) *mutual affection*, (b) *primordial community*, (c) *community of belief*, and (d) *civil community*; and
- (4) *Power*- (a) *influence*, (b) *authority*, and (c) *coercive control*.

*Exchange* exists when each actor in the relationship reciprocally performs an action which is a service or a good to the other. *Common interests* operate when each actor is motivated to perform the expected action in anticipation of an advantage to be gained from a third party or some other external source. *Solidarity* operates as an instigation of ordered or concerted action when it is believed that advantage will accrue to the collectivity as such or to the other partners as members of the collectivity; the collectivity might be constituted through ties of *mutual affection*, or *primordial* (e.g. kinship, ethnic, or territorial) identity, or on a common possession of *sacred symbols*, or on a common membership in a *civil community*.

The order or the articulation of the actions of a plurality of actors by *power* occurs when the pattern of the actions to be performed issues from an actor or actors other than those whose actions are to be articulated. *Influence* is a form of power which entails (i) the provision of patterns or models through the presentation of concrete exemplary actions or 'ideals'. Influence can also

operate (ii) through the provision of cognitive maps (e.g. intelligence-appreciations) and generalized plans (e.g. blueprints of action such as tactical or strategic programmes) which might be incorporated into any of the previously cited mechanisms. *Coercive control* may operate through commands believed to be enforceable by sanctions such as the withholding of rewards (e.g. income) or desired conditions (e.g. physical mobility or physical well-being), or through control over conditions to which the actors must adapt themselves at their own cost.

Authority is that form of power which orders or articulates the actions of other actors through commands which are effective because those who are commanded regard the commands as *legitimate*. Authority differs from coercive control, since the latter elicits conformity with its commands and prescriptions through its capacity to reward or punish. The distinction is an analytical one, since empirically authority and coercive control exist together in many combinations.

Authority is therefore by definition legitimate authority. Its effectiveness in controlling the actions of those towards whom it is directed is affected by the concurrent operation of other mechanisms. Thus (legitimate) authority might be reinforced by the concurrent operation of mechanisms of exchange between the exerciser of authority and the person (or persons) commanded, e.g. the latter might receive a specific payment (wages or salary) in return for the performance of specific actions. The exerciser of authority and the person who is its object might also have *common interests* (although not equally shared) in the attainment of a collective goal such as the winning of a battle or the fulfilment of an economic programme. The exerciser and the object of authority might be linked through *solidarity* which will be served by their collaboration such as the winning of a game or the improvement in the quality of performance of a university; they might also have ties of *personal affection* or of *ethnic identity*, etc. In all these instances, the concurrent operation of the mechanism in question with the exercise of (legitimate) authority might either strengthen or weaken the motivation for conformity with the commands issued by the exerciser of authority and therewith will strengthen or weaken the motivation for the performance of the particular action. It should be emphasized that the different mechanisms might not operate harmoniously. Thus, there might not be common interests between the exerciser and the object of legitimate authority. The exerciser and the object might have no ties or solidarity; they might indeed dislike each other personally or be alien ethnically, etc. They might also be involved in an exchange relationship which is unsatisfactory to the subordinated person in the sense that the reward which he receives is, in accordance with his beliefs, incommensurate with the action which he is expected to perform.

It should also be pointed out that the exercise of coercive control might be harmonious, or in conflict, with the exercise of legitimate authority. The exercise of coercive control in an irregular manner might cause the legitimacy of the authority of the exerciser of coercive control to be questioned and thus make for resistance to it; but at the same time, a substantial attribution of legitimacy might still survive and be effective.

The legitimacy of authority is ultimately a matter of belief concerning the rightfulness of the institutional system through which authority is exercised,

concerning the rightfulness of the exerciser's incumbency in the authoritative role within the institutional system, concerning the rightfulness of the command itself or of the mode of its promulgation.

Max Weber classified the modes of the legitimation of authority into *traditional*, *rational-legal*, and *charismatic*. The *traditional* mode of legitimation consists in the belief that the institutions of authority are continuous with institutions which have existed for a very long time, or that the exerciser of authority has acceded to the authoritative role by a procedure and in accordance with qualifications which have been valid for a very long time, or that the commands which he enunciates are either substantially identical with commands which are believed to have been valid for a very long time or are exercised by him in accordance with a discretionary power which the incumbents, or the predecessors with whom he is legitimately linked, have possessed for a very long time.

The *rational-legal* mode of legitimation rests on the belief that the institutional system of the exerciser of authority, the accession of the incumbent to the authoritative role, and the substance and mode of promulgation of the command (or rule) are in accordance with a more general rule or rules.

The *charismatic* mode of legitimation rests on the belief that the exerciser of authority and the rule or command which he enunciates possess certain sacred properties.

In all three cases the legitimacy of a system of authoritative institutions, the accession of the incumbents, and the substance and mode of promulgation of the rule or command are imputed on the basis of beliefs about some direct or indirect connection with some ultimate legitimating 'power'. That ultimate legitimating 'power' might be the will of God, the founders of the dynasty or society, natural law, the will of the people, etc. In other words, the traditional and the rational-legal modes of legitimation of authority also rest on beliefs about some imputed connection with a sacred, i.e. charismatic, source. They differ from the charismatic mode of legitimation by virtue of their indirect or mediated connection with the sacred source, i.e. charisma, in contrast with the more direct connection of charismatically legitimated authority.

Both rulers and subjects, i.e. the exercisers and the objects of authority, experience a need to believe in the legitimacy of the authority which they exercise or to which they are subject. Rulers experience the need because they see in it a strengthening of their power and also because they have a subjective need to believe that what they are doing is right, i.e. in accordance with some higher law. They need to justify themselves. Their subjects have a similar need to see order in the universe in which they live which will render meaningful, and therewith acceptable, their position; and the deprivations, which are entailed in that subordinate position, by fitting them into a larger pattern. Partly from the cognitive need for order, partly from the need to see meaning in their own position in the world and in their own share of the good and evil things offered by life, they must believe in a pattern in the world's affairs. This is why they wish to see power exercised legitimately rather than illegitimately.

Yet power is often looked upon as illegitimate by those over whom it is exercised. It is regarded as coercive control rather than as legitimate

authority. To be legitimate it must be subsumable under a more general pattern or order of meaning. When it obviously fails to conform with that order its claims to legitimacy are refuted.

Power is regarded as coercive control rather than as legitimate authority when it acts unjustly, i.e. contrarily to the highest general rules regarding the distribution of roles, rewards, and facilities. Authority can also lose its legitimacy when its effectiveness in the maintenance of order and in the distribution of roles, rewards, etc., weaken or fail. There is a tendency for effective coercive control to acquire legitimacy, i.e., to have legitimacy attributed to it by those subject to it, when it is effective in maintaining order, even though that order might be injurious to many of those who live under it.

In no society is there a universal attribution of legitimacy to power. The gaps in solidarity (ethnic solidarity and the solidarity of belief) make for a withholding of the attribution of legitimacy; similarly the belief in the existence of divergent interests between the powerful and those over whom their power is exercised can also inhibit the attribution of legitimacy. The failure of the rulers of a regime to establish or maintain the legitimacy of the order which they create or which they are held responsible for having created and maintained renders that order more unstable. The failure to maintain legitimacy heightens the probability of the replacement of the rulers and their regime by another set of rulers and by a new regime. See E. A. Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*, 1975, ch. 1. E.A.S.

**avoidance.** In many societies persons or groups who stand in particular relationships avoid each other. As a mode of behaviour, avoidance always expresses respect. Although avoidance involves two parties, and although the prohibitions are binding on both, it is usually the duty of one party specifically to avoid the other, e.g. as when it is the duty of a man to avoid his wife's mother. The extent of avoidance varies from society to society and may include such prohibitions as not eating from the same dish, to not entering the other's village. B.H.A.R.

**avunculate.** The special relationship that persists in some societies between a man and his mother's brother.

This term, from the Latin *avunculus* ('mother's brother') is sometimes used to describe the *authority* of the mother's brother over his sister's children in a matrilineal society, and sometimes to describe the *indulgent* relationship that exists between maternal uncle and nephew in many societies, and which includes, for example, privileged joking. Yet again it is used, as in the definition, to indicate *any* specially marked relationship between these relatives.

As examples of its use see A. I. Richards, 'Some Types of Family Structure Amongst the Central Bantu', in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde (eds.), *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage*, 1950.

As a summary of the literature on the subject, and further examples of the variety of usage, see C. Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, ch. 2, 1963, and J. Goody, 'The Mother's Brother and Sister's Son in West Africa', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 89, 1959. See JOKING RELATIONSHIPS, MATRILINEAL. J.R.F.



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# B

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**barbarian; barbarism.** A term used colloquially to describe a rude or uncivilized person, originally used to describe a non-Hellene or a non-Roman.

The sociological connotation gained currency as a result of the famous book by Lewis H. Morgan entitled *Ancient Society*, 1877, the sub-title of which is *Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization*. The word *barbarism*, therefore, has been used in a context of social development of the human race as a middle stage. Morgan held that there was convincing evidence that, as he put it, 'savagery preceded barbarism in all the tribes of mankind, as barbarism is known to have preceded civilization'. And he added: 'The history of the human race is one in source, one in experience, one in progress.' Few modern sociologists would be as confident as this. Moreover, the stages of social development were equally clear to him, less so to contemporary sociologists. *Savagery* describes the long formative period of human existence from the earliest times up until the advent of those inventions which ushered in the *barbaric* stage. The latter is marked by four features: the domestication of animals, the discovery of cereals, the use of stone in architecture, and the invention of the method of smelting iron ore. Hunters and gatherers characterize the stage of savagery; the growth of agriculture together with the sedentary manner of life associated with it are features of the barbaric state. Morgan, however, discerned three stages within barbarism. The first of these stages, and the one marking the end of the upper stage of savagery, was notable for the invention of pottery; middle barbarism was the period when the domestication of animals took place in the Eastern hemisphere and the cultivation of land with the help of irrigation in the Western hemisphere. The invention of iron and its use characterized upper barbarism, a period which closed with the growth of the phonetic alphabet. This and the use of writing and the making of metal tools marked the beginnings of civilization.

Various writers made use of Morgan's scheme, altered or improved upon it. Notable among them was Gordon Childe, who in his book *Social Evolution*, 1951, emphasized the technology of food-production as the mark of the change from *savagery* to *barbarism*. Childe questioned Morgan's criterion of writing, as the invention which distinguished *barbarism* from *civilization*, arguing that this would mean the inclusion of the Maya Indians among the civilized even though they had not invented the wheel and relied for cultivation on the primitive slash-and-burn technique.

The fact is that it is by no means as easy as Morgan thought it was to divide up the history of human society into these three stages. Yet the terms have been used by anthropologists. Occasionally, reference is still made to savages, but the term is loosely used to denote members of a non-literate society

possessing only a rudimentary technology, and it is used in contrast to *civilized people*. The term *barbarian*, like the term *barbarism*, is little used today.

G.D.M.

**Barnard, Chester I** (1886–1961). An American businessman who had a keen eye for the nature of organization, he spent most of his working life in the telephone and telegraph industry, finally becoming President of the New Jersey Bell Company. He found time to write a famous work *The Function of the Executive*, 1938. This book and a number of papers of considerable interest on formal social organization have contributed to the literature on occupational roles and the relationship of status systems to the goals of business enterprise.

**Becker, Howard** (1899–1960). American sociologist who taught at the University of Wisconsin. He believed the essence of sociology to be a consideration of values and advocated what he called 'constructive typologies'. His work drew on that of Max Weber and Leopold v. Wiese. The term 'interpretive sociology' is attributable to him but his later interest lay in analytical studies. He collaborated with H. C. Barnes to edit the large historical reference work *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, 1938, 3rd edition, 1961.

**behaviour.** See ACTION.

**Benedict, Ruth Fulton** (1887–1948). American anthropologist and poet. She studied under Boas and Kroeber and in 1922 began a field study of the Serrano Indians of California. Subsequent studies of Indian tribes included the Zuni Pueblo Indians, the Cochiti and the Pima. Her approach was to analyse the characteristic 'culture patterns' of these peoples, a method she described in a paper in 1928, but which was more popularly expressed in her famous work *Patterns of Culture*, 1934. During the Second World War she turned her attention to both Asia and Europe and her examination of Japanese culture published under the title *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* in 1946 is one of the best known analyses of a value system of a large-scale society; its effect upon public policy in America towards Japan was not inconsiderable. She was a woman of striking appearance, she brought a fresh approach to cultural anthropology and she influenced many others. She taught at Columbia University. Ruth Benedict brought to her work a great depth of perception as well as a sound training in scientific techniques; in her the poet and the social scientist were inseparable.

G.D.M.

**bilateral.** A term used to describe the transmission of descent or of property rights through both male and female parents, without emphasizing either one or the other lines. The term *bilateral* is used in contradistinction to the term *unilineal*. See KINSHIP.

**Bonald, Louis de** (1754–1840). French writer who opposed the individualistic ideas of the Enlightenment and who regarded society as a reality in itself having a life of its own.